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Abstract
Since their inception, scholars have questioned the efficacy of internationalized
criminal tribunals, or ICTs. ICTs are a tool for the international community to deal with
and punish perpetrators of atrocities. More recent ad hoc (or ‘as needed’) tribunals, such
as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) also stated goals beyond the retributive justice of
punishment; they sought to promote reconciliation. I examined why these courts were
ultimately unable to promote reconciliation. Through an analysis of the histories,
formation, and implementation of the ICTY and SCSL, I found that these tribunals were
limited in their capacity to promote reconciliation because of their commitment to
norms of retributive justice. Despite expressly stating goals of reconciliation, neither
tribunal was able to make a discernible impact on reconciliation in the Balkans or in
Sierra Leone. Instead, ICTs are a way for the international community to further their
normative notions of justice without promoting reconciliation for the civilian
populations harmed in violent conflict.
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Introduction
Internationalized criminal tribunals (ICTs) are a mechanism the international
community has relied on in order to manage the aftermath of atrocities. They are said to
have the potential to advance peace and reconciliation processes (Kazi 2018; Roth 2005).
However, this potential has not been weighed with consideration to an ICTs
commitment to the norms of retributive justice. In this context, reconciliation would
consist of addressing harm committed against a civilian population, material
reparations or immaterial redress for victims, and truth-seeking efforts. Retribution
refers to the goal of punishment of perpetrators to achieve justice (International Center
for Transitional Justice 2020). Even with an explicitly stated commitment toward
reconciliation, the origins and structure of the internationalized criminal tribunal
inhibits reconciliation. I directly compare the stated expectations and implicit goals of
internationalized criminal tribunals with their outcomes and how those outcomes are
perceived in domestic contexts. After analyzing the formation and implementation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (SCSL), there is no evidence to suggest reconciliation was furthered by
prosecution through criminal tribunals. In fact, in both contexts the criminal tribunals
created barriers to the possibility of reconciliation. Ultimately, the tribunals served as a
mechanism for the international community to further the norms of justice set out at the
inception of the criminal tribunal, instead of promoting reconciliation for the civilian
populations who were harmed in violent conflict.
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Case Study Selection
The ICTY was the first ad hoc criminal tribunal established since the military
tribunals following WWII (ad hoc m
 eaning ‘as needed’). Prosecution through the ICTY
modeled the modern legal standards that the tribunals following it would take into
consideration. However, being the first internationalized criminal tribunal in decades,
one might expect that the mechanisms for the ICTY were not yet fully fleshed out. Or, at
the very least, one could expect that a court operating in unprecedented circumstances
might not be able to fulfill their mandate in regards to reconciliation. This case, then,
would more obviously affirm that ICTs fail to facilitate reconciliation. The Special Court
for Sierra Leone, however, was established nearly a decade after the ICTY was. Having
the lessons from former Yugoslavia, the SCSL should have had an easier time fulfilling
a mandate that similarly called for reconciliation. In addition, the SCSL was formed
concurrently with a functioning Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Despite these
factors, the case of the SCSL proves that a criminal tribunal’s commitment to retribution
overrides their stated goal of reconciliation. Where this tribunal should have had an
easier time meeting the goals of its mandate, it could not overcome the barriers that
retributive norms of justice place on reconciliation (Schabas 2006).

Section Overview
First, the literature review examines existing scholarship in international legal
studies on the topic of ad hoc tribunals, and tracks the major arguments for and against
their efficacy as a mechanism for justice. A brief discussion of the theoretical
frameworks of justice, retribution, and reconciliation that this thesis operates with
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precedes the historical background of ad hoc tribunals. Specifically, I examine the
establishment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) following the atrocities
committed in the European theater of WWII. The formation and mandate of the IMT
laid the groundwork for the ad hoc tribunals that followed in the 1990s and early 2000s.
After contextualizing the norms of international criminal prosecution as set out by the
IMT, I elaborate on the particular histories related to the establishment of my case
studies. This consists of a brief conflict overview in both former Yugoslavia and Sierra
Leone, followed by details regarding the mandates and establishment of the ICTY and
SCSL. I examine the trial proceedings themselves in conjunction with the domestic
reactions to those proceedings in their respective regions. Lastly, I analyze the tribunals
and their outcomes in light of some of the arguments presented in the literature review
and the goals set out by the mandates of the tribunals. In the conclusion I explain how
the retributive framework backing the internationalized criminal tribunals results in the
failure of each tribunal to meaningfully contribute to reconciliation efforts in each
region.

Literature Review
Scholarship surrounding ICTs and international law in general is relatively new.
In fact, legal education in the United States on the subject only began within the last few
decades. Up until the 1970s, only three people were teaching international criminal law.
Now, the topic of international law and in turn international criminal tribunals has been
well documented and studied by legal scholars globally (Bassiouni 2008). New
scholarship was especially common in the wake of the International Criminal Tribunal
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for former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The
explosion of scholarship in the early 2000s paid attention to the structures and
immediate outcomes of those ICTs, and argued largely over the question of whether or
not ICTs are a useful mechanism for post-conflict reconciliation (Knoops 2014; Nouwen
2017).
On the question of the efficacy of ad hoc internationalized criminal trials, there are
two consensuses that prevail; one body of scholarship addresses the successes of ICTs,
and claims that, though imperfect, they produce positive outcomes for peace processes,
while the other is concerned with their failures, making the claim that the effects of ICTs
are negative or at least do not impact the ends of peace seeking. One author who has
written extensively about the foundations and discernible merits of ICTs is Geert-Jan
Alexander Knoops. Knoops, who had first hand involvement in the tribunals for
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, is a tentative proponent of the value of ICTs. He
explains, “ad hoc ICT in specific regions of conflict, such as the UN Special Court for
Sierra Leone, can prove to be effective mechanisms of international criminal law”
(Knoops 2014). While acknowledging that hasty development of international law could
jeopardize its validity by creating conflicting case law and differences in jurisprudence,
Knoops affirms that ICTs can contribute to the interests of peace and security within a
given nation. Despite a lack of evidence given on that matter, Knoops does briefly give
an account of some of the main arguments used by advocates of ICTs. These are:
a) ICTs are a deterrent to major human rights violations,
b) peace is furthered by the punishment of perpetrators, and
c) ICTs give victims redress for the wrongs committed against them.
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Put another way by director of Human Rights Watch Kenneth Roth, “Bringing to justice
those who commit atrocities has obvious appeal. It provides redress for victims and
their families, punishes perpetrators, and deters others from replicating their crimes”
(Roth 2005). Generally, adversaries to the notion of ICTs as an effective mechanism cite
a lack of evidence in support of that conclusion, and in some cases, evidence that refutes
it all together. Here, we will examine some primary objections to each argument in
conversation with their proponents.
“International Criminal Tribunals are an effective deterrent against atrocities”
In a study done on the deterrent effect of international criminal tribunals, the
authors found a number of conclusions about deterrence and retribution that call into
question the extent to which ICTs can function as a deterrent to human rights
violations. The authors explain that in many case studies, the threat of prosecution leads
to cover-ups from high ranking officials as opposed to actual deterrence. They
conclude, “It is, thus, problematic to attempt to measure or correlate deterrence with the
work of international criminal courts. At best, it is possible to document parallel events,
either a decrease or an increase in violence, but there are too many actors and too many
variables to find a direct or even an indirect effect conclusively” (Schense and Carter
2017). They also note the importance of perception in evaluating deterrence, claiming
that evaluations of deterrence, in place of actual evidence, is a direct byproduct of
selectivity or politicization of the conflicts and resulting tribunals. That is to say,
without definitive evidence that at least points toward ICTs acting as a legitimate
deterrence mechanism, it is not possible to impartially reach a conclusion about
deterrence (Schense and Carter 2017).

Weinman 8
“Peace processes are furthered by ICTs”
The argument commonly put forth by scholars in support of ICTs as a
mechanism for peace processes is that while ICTs are clearly not a mode of negotiation
or reconciliation, they nevertheless promote norms of peace and justice in societies
affected by atrocities. Greenwalt explains this view, writing, “By revealing the truth
about atrocities, satisfying victim demands for justice, and emphasizing individual over
collective responsibility, the hope is that tribunals will help break cycles of violence,
delegitimize criminal regimes, and promote transitions to peaceful liberal societies
rooted in the rule of law” (Greenwalt 2014). As was the case with the deterrence
argument, there is little evidence that supports that conclusion (Meernick 2005). Some
of the strongest arguments in favor of this interpretation of ICTs rely on the hope that
the norms advanced in prosecuting atrocities will further moral ends and in turn
transform behavior (Akhavan 2001). Nearly 80 years after the first internationalized
tribunal, there is still no empirical evidence to advance the theory that moral
transformation is a reliable product of prosecution through ICTs.
While ICTs may bring about outcomes that conform with a retributive notion of
justice, it has not yet been demonstrated that ICTs aid the ends of peace processes such
as negotiation.Additionally, many scholars claim that the threat of prosecution on the
international stage fails to ease tensions between warring parties. Nouwen explains
how the implementation of ICTs relates to this argument, “The prosecution takes place
in far away courtrooms, in which the key actors are lawyers not familiar with the
conflict and culture in which the crimes have been committed. Consequently, many of
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the potentially positive effects that trials can have on the society concerned do not reach
the affected society” (Nouwen 2017). The nature of ad hoc t ribunals that follow this
format is an impediment to reconciliation, for they distance a potential mechanism for
peace and justice from the society that needs it.
“ICTs provide redress for victims of human rights violations”
The third leading argument advanced in defense of ICTs is that prosecution of
war crimes creates a unique opportunity for victims to legitimize their experiences and
achieve a sense of closure. Dorjee Kazi, in an article about the possible connections
between criminal tribunals and truth-seeking processes argues, “Criminal courts and
tribunals provide the victims with an indispensable component in overcoming their
demons and moving on– that is closure. Without retribution (justice), the entire concept
of modern democratic society is intrinsically dismantled” (Kazi 2018). This argument in
particular is contentious on multiple grounds. It equates justice with retribution, and it
claims that tribunals are a crucial component of seeking closure after violent conflict.
Neither claim is supported by empirical evidence. The latter claim, in fact, has been
refuted by a number of scholars.
In a study of the role of victims in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials following
WWII, Luke Moffet comments, “... justice for victims was simply for the retributive
purpose of punishing the defendants. Victims were just used to rationalize and license
the punishment of defendants without obtaining a more tangible form of justice, such as
reparations'' (Moffet 2012). Victim support does not play a key role in international
criminal proceedings as they might in other conflict resolution efforts. Rather, the
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structure of an internationalized criminal tribunal and the nature of trial proceedings as
modeled after western frameworks of criminal law necessitates that the role of a victim
is that of aiding or complicating the prosecutor’s goal of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Richard Wilson (2011) puts it this way: “Many international tribunal
judgements steer a careful course between legal minimalism on the one hand and
nationalist dramaturgy on the other hand”. That is to say, a tribunal toes the line
between utility and performativity in a courtroom setting. Neither expressly benefits
victims of violent conflict either materially or otherwise.
Scholarship cites a lack of evidence supporting a conclusion that ICTs can
effectively support peace processes. This thesis, as opposed to echoing these scholars,
aims to explain the conceptual gap between the goals stated by ICTs and the norms they
are committed to maintaining. As opposed to restating that ICTs have not contributed
to reconciliation, I answer the question, why can’t they fulfill that goal? Ad hoc tribunals
are framed as a mechanism for peace and justice, and while many scholars
acknowledge and explore weaknesses in ICTs, few examine the conceptual
discrepancies between the established goals of ICTs and their execution. To rectify this,
this thesis puts the stated and implied expectations of ICTs in direct comparison with
the outcomes the tribunals following the Yugoslav wars and the Sierra Leonean Civil
War produced.
Further, most literature that concerns flaws in ad hoc tribunals pay attention
chiefly to the trials for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The establishment of norms at
Nuremberg and their application are not examined through a critical analysis of its
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stated goals and outcomes. The tribunal for Sierra Leone is scarcely discussed in
literature surrounding ICTs at all. While I will be drawing on former Yugoslavia as one
of the better documented case studies in my thesis, I shed more light on how the
failures identified at Yugoslavia are rooted in Nuremberg and also manifested in Sierra
Leone. These failures persist despite innovations introduced at Sierra Leone (namely the
concurrent establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
appreciable contribution to the establishment of the tribunal by the Sierra Leonean
state). By analyzing these case studies in such a manner, the aforementioned conceptual
discrepancies within ICTs as a mechanism are demonstrated and can in turn be related
to the conclusions of other scholars that question the efficacy of internationalized
criminal tribunals.

Theoretical Frameworks of Justice
 Throughout this thesis, I feature an extensive comparison of the norms of
retributive justice to the norms of reconciliation. While there are numerous
interpretations of what constitutes retributive justice and what constitutes reconciliatory
justice, we will be moving forward with the definitions provided by the International
Center for Transitional Justice.
Retributive justice focuses on the pursuit of justice through the punishment of
offenders as opposed to the rehabilitation of offenders. Criminal prosecution through
ICTs follows the adversarial format; witnesses are directed and cross examined by
opposing sides, and the opposing sides go head to head advancing their own narrative
based on evidence presented at trial. This adversarial format is conducive to retributive
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justice. Adversarial trials, beyond trying to establish a record, are pursuing guilt of the
accused. Retribution seeks the punishment of those found guilty.
Reconciliation, on the other hand, is a key component of transitional justice that
focuses on accountability and redress for victims as opposed to punishment. The ICTJ
notes that reconciliation is the ultimate goal of a society dealing with the aftermath of
violent conflict. It is a process that often involves truth-seeking, reparations, and public
recognition of harm. While many ICTs came to establish reconciliation as one of their
goals, the first manifestation of an internationalized tribunal did not expressly deal with
the prospect of reconciliation (International Center for Transitional Justice 2020).

The Legal Basis of ICTs
Legacy of Nuremberg
The internationalized criminal tribunal is a recent innovation in the legal realm,
only implemented in the wake of atrocities committed during the second world war.
The first ever internationalized tribunal was the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, or the IMT. The IMT was founded in 1945, six months after Germany
surrendered and two years after the Moscow Declaration, where the allied powers
established that atrocities perpetrated by the Third Reich would not be left unpunished.
The charter for the IMT was drafted with the consideration that the crimes had no strict
geographic designation, and that the crimes committed were done by people, not the
abstract entity of ‘the state’ (Heller 2011).
The establishment of the IMT raised questions about the legitimacy of an
internationalized court. Namely, can an international mechanism enforce ex-post facto
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(or, retroactive) laws? The short answer is yes. The argument used to warrant such
punishment can be put as simply as, “you know a war crime when you see one.” That
is, even without a codified domestic or international law that bars one from committing
war crimes, reasonable people would agree on what constitutes a violation of human
rights. The European Human Rights Convention of 1950 (EHRC) affirmed this
reasoning, “This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for
any act or omission which at the time when it was committed, was criminal according
to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” (European Human
Rights Convention of 1950, Article 7). Though not explicitly stated as criminal,
prosecutors at Nuremberg appealed to a deeply felt revulsion to acts perpetrated by
Nazi leadership. The “general principles of law” the EHRC refers to appeals to the same
thing. Tomushat explains, “There cannot be the slightest doubt that all the offences set
out under the title ‘crimes against humanity’ are not only morally objectionable, but
deserve to be punished and must be punished because of their abhorrent character if
peaceful coexistence in human society is to be maintained” (Tomuschat 2006). The
question before internationalized tribunals is not if punishment is justified, but how to
maintain the peaceful coexistence of society through a mechanism that is focused on
punishment and guilt.
The charter for the IMT set forth the basis for the future charters of other
international tribunals. It outlined the definition of offenses tried in the court, as well as
established the jurisdiction of a court that is trying crimes across a wide geographic and
temporal range (specifically, anywhere in the European Axis countries for the entire
span of WWII and the time leading up to it). The 1945 Charter of the International
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Military Tribunal specifically outlined the charges of 1) Crimes against peace, 2) War
crimes, and 3) Crimes against humanity (United Nations 1945, Article 6). Since the IMT
codified these offenses, future tribunals would not encounter the questions of ex-post
facto punishment; the charters of the ICTY and the SCSL utilize these specific charges
and their definitions. The official classification of these violations of human rights made
establishing later courts easier. The structure of the IMT also contributed to the
structure of subsequent tribunals; it set the precedent for internationalized trials to
include actors from multiple states, to be tried in front of multiple judges, and to use
translators.
The atrocities tried at the IMT were codified at the fourth Geneva Convention
(1949). In a departure from the first three Geneva Conventions (which were concerned
with the protection of sick or wounded military personnel and prisoners of war), the
fourth Geneva Convention expanded existing articles to extend to a civilian population,
as well as adding provisions to that effect. This convention was adopted specifically in
reaction to WWII and the IMT. It outlined that parties may bring persons alleged to
have committed ‘grave breaches’ to their own courts or hand them over to other courts
(United Nations 1949, Article 146). The convention defines grave breaches as the
“willful killing, torture, or inhuman treatment… of a protected person,” among many
other specifications on what constitutes unlawful actions in war time (United Nations
1949, Article 147).
The IMT did not, however clearly define the charge of genocide. The charge of
genocide had not yet been clearly defined at this point in international legal history. In
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fact, it was a misconception of mine that the IMT was trying and punishing individuals
for their participation in genocide. While the international community recognizes a
genocide took place, neither the charter for the IMT nor the Geneva Convention dealt
with genocide. The UN Genocide Convention in 1948 still did not develop a strict
definition of what constitutes genocide. Rather, that convention created a minimal
formula so that future courts could try individuals for genocide in a way that the IMT
was not able to (Knoops 2014).
Introducing Retribution to International Criminal Law
The IMT’s stated goal from the beginning was to punish the aggressors of WWII,
to “pursue them to the ends of the earth” (Moscow Declaration of 1943). It sought
individual responsibility, and it sought retribution (Tomuschat 2006). Robert Jackson,
prosecutor for the United States, said in his closing statement, “If you were to say of
these men that they are not guilty, it would be true to say there has been no war, there
are no slain, and there has been no crime” (Nuremberg, July 26, 1946). Jackson’s appeal
here emphasizes the symbolic importance of tribunals and the precedent that was set
out at the IMT. The process of seeking justice in a way that punishes those who are
imputed with blame while simultaneously making moral judgements is unique to a
retributive framework of justice. Jackson particularly appeals to establishing an
irrefutable record of the atrocities that took place and the defendant’s role(s) in such
atrocities.
Nowhere in the documents relating to the IMT, between the Moscow
Declaration, the Nuremberg Charter, or the records from the trials, is there a stated
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commitment toward reconciliation or peace-making. As Schabas puts it, “the word
‘reconciliation’, so fashionable today, never figured in this first experiment with
international justice” (Schabas 2006). The commitment toward retribution made by the
IMT is echoed in the charters of the ICTY and the SCSL, but both of these tribunals also
state goals of reconciliation. Still, the IMT allowed for other tribunals to connect the
international community’s notion of justice with their ability to enforce the law, even if
the law is not strictly codified in a domestic context. Jackson explained in his closing
argument of the IMT, “...it rises above the provincial and transient and seeks guidance
not only from international law but also from the basic principles of jurisprudence
which are assumptions of civilization and which long have found embodiment in the
codes of all nations” (Nuremberg, July 26, 1946). Internationalized tribunals all appeal
to the ‘assumptions of civilization’ that call for the prosecution of war crimes; they share
the desire to punish, and through punishment, find ‘justice’.

Case Study Backgrounds
The Yugoslav Wars
The International Court for former Yugoslavia was established in reaction to a
series of conflicts, insurgencies, and wars for independence that took place between
1991-2002 in the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a federation of states made up of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia created
in the aftermath of WWII. The federation represented a wide range of ethnic groups and
religious convictions. Ethnic tensions were invigorated in former Yugoslavia after the
death of President Josip Broz Tito in 1980, as communism collapsed in the region and
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nationalism surged in Eastern Europe. In the wake of economic and political
uncertainty, political leaders relied on nationalist rhetoric to sow distrust between
ethnic groups, degrade a common Yugoslav identity, and advocate for independence
for the distinct republic in the federation (International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals 2017; Judah 2011).
The deadliest of the conflicts that make up the Yugoslav wars was the conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina lasting between 1992-1995. The dispute over territorial control
between Bosnian Serbs (with backing from Serbia and JNA), the Bosnian Croats, and
the Bosnian government resulted in the deaths of over 140,000 people, and the
displacement of over half the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (approximately 2
million people). According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, civilians
from every ethnicity became victims of war crimes and widespread attacks, thousands
of Bosnian women were raped systematically, and detention centers were set up by all
sides of the conflict (International Center for Transitional Justice 2011).
In the summer of 1995, Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic led forces to attack
Srebrenica, a Bosnian town declared a safe area by the United Nations. During this
attack, over 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed by Serb forces, and the
women and children of the town were driven out. Many were raped and brutalized in
the process. This conflict, referred to as the Bosnian Genocide, is the first European
crime to be classified as genocidal since WWII. Before the official cessation of the
conflict in 1993, the ICTY was established (International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals 2017).
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Sierra Leonean Civil War
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created in the wake of the Sierra Leonean
Civil War that waged between 1991-2002. On March 23rd, 1991, the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles
Taylor attempted to overthrow the incumbent President of Sierra Leone Joseph Momah.
This kicked off a decade of armed conflict in Sierra Leone. Both the RUF and the Sierra
Leone government were financed by funds generated by the requisition and sale of
“blood diamonds''. The term blood diamonds refer to alluvial diamonds mined using
forced labor to fund insurgent activity. Alluvial diamonds are easily accessed in certain
districts in Sierra Leone, and have been critical in perpetuating the cycle of corruption
in Sierra Leone (Gberie 2005; Momodu 2017).
This civil war is not only characterized as a fight over resources, but as a stage
for widespread atrocities over the course of a decade. It’s estimated that between
1991-2002, Sierra Leone suffered around 70,000 casualties and 2.6 million displaced
people. Almost all parties in the conflict, including but not limited to RUF rebels,
ECOMOG, Sierra Leone Army, and the police are considered culpable for abuses of
human rights. These abuses included rape and sexual assault, use of child combatants,
massacres, and other forms of brutality (Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone n.d.;
Kaldor and Vincent 2006). The SCSL was established after the cessation of conflict in
2002.

Objectives and Expectations
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As previously mentioned, the tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone
share all of the normative objectives of the International Military Tribunal. These are
objectives related to establishing responsibility, punishing perpetrators, deterring future
atrocities, and fulfilling a desire to render justice in the face of human rights violations
(Schabas 2006). However, the ICTY and SCSL attempted to innovate the role of a
tribunal in international conflict resolution. They aimed to incorporate goals of
reconciliation into a retributive legal framework, “the idea is that holding perpetrators
accountable will contribute to reviving the rule of law for sustainable peace in
post-conflict situations” (Nkansah 2014). The aim was that retribution through criminal
prosecution can positively contribute to the ends of maintaining peace and promoting
restoration of society in conflict-ridden regions.
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
The key objectives are stated by the legacy website for the ICTY, “by bringing
perpetrators to trial, the ICTY aims to deter future crimes and render justice to
thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in the
former Yugoslavia” (International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 2017).
Individual accountability as a feature of the criminal justice system is utilized by ICTs to
shift the blame away from entire groups (religious, ethnic, political) whose members
may be innocent or even victims of atrocities themselves.
Though not explicitly mentioned in the establishing charter for the ICTY, the first
annual report for the ICTY clarifies the desired role of the tribunal as a mechanism for
reconciliation and a means at promoting internationally accepted norms of peace.
Despite following the same retributive framework as the IMT, the First Annual Report
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for the ICTY claims, “Far from being a vehicle for revenge, it is a tool for promoting
reconciliation and restoring true peace” (UN General Assembly Security Council 1994,
Article 17). The report’s expectations for the tribunal’s contribution to peace are high,
“the establishment of the Tribunal should undoubtedly be regarded as a measure
designed to promote peace by meting out justice in a manner conducive to the full
establishment of healthy and cooperative relations among the various national and
ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia” (UN General Assembly Security Council 1994,
Article 17). The tribunal hoped to go beyond the typical scope of criminal prosecution
that is concerned with proving guilt. The idea is that by proving guilt, the tribunal will
enable reconciliation processes that involve truth-seeking and healing (Schabas 2006).
Special Court for Sierra Leone
The UN Security Council, in establishing the SCSL, affirmed that the
international community would stand behind every effort toward achieving justice. In
fact, the resolution that called for the establishment of the court claims, “a credible
system of justice and accountability for the very serious crimes committed [in Sierra
Leone] would end impunity and would contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace” (UN Security Council
2000). A stated aim was to pursue the punishment of perpetrators who have inhibited
or threatened the establishment of peace processes in Sierra Leone (Nkansah 2014).
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
However, the SCSL did not stand alone as a mechanism toward reconciliation.
The court was established concurrently with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
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(TRC), whose goal was to pursue reconciliation without being concerned with the
punishment of perpetrators and retribution (First Annual Report for the Special Court
for Sierra Leone 2002). There was a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation
established in Yugoslavia in March 2001, but the commission dissolved when
Yugoslavia dissolved into Serbia and Montenegro in early 2003. This commission never
actually conducted any interviews, filed any reports, or held any hearings. Nobody was
even hired to work for the commission until six months after its inception. Effectively,
there was no TRC for the Yugoslav Wars. In contrast, the TRC for Sierra Leone was able
to produce reports, collect data, and even impart recommendations to the Sierra
Leonean government on how to further the ends of reconciliation (Hayner 2011).
Though the TRC for Sierra Leone was not a body of the SCSL, the SCSL ought to have a
better shot than the ICTY at making a distinguishable impact on the advancement of
reconciliatory goals toward peace in Sierra Leone.

Establishment of the Courts
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
The establishment of the ICTY marked the first internationalized criminal
tribunal since the Nuremberg Trials. This tribunal was proposed by German foreign
minister Klaus Kinkel in an effort to control the unrest in the Balkans. After attempts
from the international community to pressure Yugoslavian leaders to refrain from
conflict through diplomatic, economic, and political means, the ICTY was unanimously
adopted by the UN Security Council with Resolution 827 (Hazan 2004).
Charter
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The charter for the ICTY is comparable to the 1945 UN Charter for the IMT in
regard to its structure and some of its stated goals. But, the ICTY charter further refines
the scope of an ICT in a conflict that, while international in character, is localized to a
particular region. Unlike the IMT, the ICTY’s jurisdiction was restricted geographically
to the land, airspace, and waters of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Its temporal jurisdiction had no set end date, but the tribunal could try crimes that
occurred on January 1, 1991 onward (United Nations 1993). Article 9 of the charter
clarifies that the ICTY had primacy over national courts, and the tribunal could ask
national courts to refer competence to the ICTY at any time. This charter, for the first
time, affirmatively defined the offense of genocide. This definition encompasses a
variety of acts committed with, “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group…” (United Nations 1993, Article 4). The charter also
defined the structure of the tribunal. The tribunal featured the following organs; the
Chambers (consisting of three Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber), the Office of
the Prosecutor, and a Registry that served both the Chambers and the Prosecutor. The
Chambers would consist of a maximum of 16 permanent judges deemed to be, “of high
moral character, impartiality, and integrity”. No two judges could be nationals of the
same state. These judges were elected from nominations of States Members of the UN
and non-member states that maintained permanent missions at the UN Headquarters
(United Nations 1993, Articles 11, 12, 13, 13 bis).
Indictments
A total of 161 people were indicted by the ICTY, and all had been apprehended
as of 2011. The majority of those indicted were Serbs. Of the 161 accused, 90 were

Weinman 23
sentenced and only 18 were acquitted. Slobodan Milošević, former President of Serbia,
faced 66 charges and was the first ever sitting head of state to face prosecution by an
international tribunal. President of Croatian Serb administration Milan Martić,
President of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadžić, and commander of the Bosnian Serb
army Ratko Mladić are among the other 161 people indicted for violations of
international law (International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 2017; UN
General Assembly Security Council 1994).
Special Court for Sierra Leone
While the ICTY was a product of the international community’s effort to promote
peace in the Balkans, the SCSL was formed out of a demand for justice within Sierra
Leone. The resolution that formed the SCSL, Resolution 1315, was only adopted by the
UN Security Council at the request of then President of Sierra Leone Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah. He appealed directly to the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to have the
international community try war crimes committed in Sierra Leone (Kabbah 2000).
Unlike the ICTY, the SCSL was established after the cessation of conflict.
Charter
The scope of this charter is limited in its jurisdiction compared to the ICTY, but
has broader powers in terms of what crimes the prosecutors could pursue indictments
for. Though the SCSL was established after the cessation of conflict, its temporal
jurisdiction was limited to crimes that occurred from November 30, 1996 and onward,
over five years after the conflict began. This court was granted the power to “prosecute
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
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human rights law and Sierra Leonean law” (United Nations and the Government of
Sierra Leone 2000). That meant they could indict those suspected of violating the
Geneva Conventions and it’s protocols, committing crimes against humanity, violations
of international humanitarian law (notably conscripting children under the age of 15 as
combatants), along with violations of Sierra Leonean law, particularly sexual violence
against young girls pursuant to the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act of 1926 and
destruction of property prohibited by the Malicious Damage Act of 1861.
This tribunal’s establishment is also distinct from the ICTY in that the majority of
the trials took place within Sierra Leone, as opposed to The Hague. Sentences were also
carried out in Sierra Leone. The SCSL statute followed the same structure of the ICTY
(Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor, and Registry), but had different
requirements for the number and selection of judges. The tribunal was to have between
8-11 independent judges, three of whom would serve in the Trial Chamber and five of
whom would serve in the Appeals Chamber. One of the judges appointed to the Trial
chamber would be selected by the government of Sierra Leone, and two would be
appointed by the UN Secretary General. In the Appeals Chamber, two would be
appointed by the government of Sierra Leone, and three would be appointed by the
Secretary General. Regardless of who appointed them, these judges should also be
persons of “high moral character, impartiality, and integrity,” language borrowed
directly from the ICTY statute (United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone,
Articles 12, 13).
Indictments
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Though the purview of prosecution was broad, only 13 people were indicted.
One individual, Johnny Paul Koroma, has not yet been apprehended, although it is
suspected that he may be deceased. Indictments were delivered to leaders of the Civil
Defense forces, the RUF, the ARFC, as well as Charles Taylor (Dittrich 2014).
Budget Constraints
While the literature does not formally establish exactly why the indictments for
the SCSL were much more limited than those for the ICTY despite a broad prosecutorial
mandate, it is likely the tribunal was inhibited by a lack of resources. The cost of
operations for the ICTY was over $1.2 billion over 10 years (Skilbeck 2008). The SCSL
operated on a budget of $222 million. The SCSL relied on funding solely from voluntary
donations (Dittrich 2014).

The Trials
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
Before any indictments were brought before the court, the Office of The
Prosecutor (OTP) had to obtain cooperation between states and build credibility. This
was initially a challenge to the court’s investigations, as some leaders in former
Yugoslavia outright denied the legitimacy of the court imposed on their territory. This
resulted in their refusal to work with the courts. The territories involved had no legal
mechanisms in place to deal with international prosecutors and investigators. To
circumvent these issues, the OTP developed a strategy that involved issuing the early
indictments to low-intermediate level perpetrators who were identified by eyewitnesses
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as committing crimes that violated the statute. This approach meant the OTP could
build its capacity, while simultaneously building cases against higher level offenders
that were ultimately deemed, “the main architects of the crimes” (International Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 2017). Whenever possible, the ICTY was charged
with pursuing convictions for those deemed most responsible for the crimes that
occurred during the Yugoslav wars.
Of the cases tried before the ICTY, there are a few that are considered landmark
cases. The ICTY affirmed for the first time a conviction of genocide. This established
what some consider an undisputable record of the genocide committed against the
Bosnians from Srebrenica. The ICTY also resulted in innovations on the international
prosecution of sex crimes. The court not only dealt with sexual violence perpetrated
against men, but held that rape constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions
and a violation of the laws and customs of war. Sexual enslavement was deemed a
crime against humanity (International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
2017).
Evidence
The OTP was able to gather evidence despite Serbian and other authorities'
denial of any crimes having taken place. Tribunal investigators relied on satellite
photography, archaeologists, anthropologists, and other specialized experts along with
the testimony of survivors to establish a record of the crimes that took place and
produce forensic evidence to that fact. In gathering evidence, the Tribunal located
thousands of missing persons through the exhumation of mass graves (Rudic, et al.
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2017). Witnesses that presented evidence at the tribunal were victims, survivors,
experts, internationals, and insiders.
Despite the evidence and increasing number of convictions brought about by the
tribunal, Serbian and Croatian authorities continually accused the tribunal of undue
bias, asserted denial in the face of certain charges, and claimed that the tribunal failed to
recognize suffering on all sides of the conflict (Hodžić 2011).
As of July 2011, the multitude of cases presented before the ICTY resulted in 90
convictions, 19 acquittals, and 37 proceedings terminated. Punishments for the
successful convictions ranged from two years to life in prison, depending on the
severity of the charge. The court relied on more than 4,650 witnesses and produced over
2.5 million pages of transcripts over the 10,800 trial days (International Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 2017).
Special Court for Sierra Leone
The SCSL benefitted not only from the precedents set by the ICTY, but from the
Sierra Leonean state’s involvement in the formation and implementation of the tribunal.
Some even consider the SCSL to be a ‘mixed’ or ‘hybrid’ tribunal, defined by the UN as
tribunals that are, “committed to ensuring that such violations are properly investigated
and appropriately sanctioned, including by bringing the perpetrators of any crimes to
justice, through national mechanisms or, where appropriate, regional or international
mechanisms, in accordance with international law” (United Nations n.d). However,
some refute this designation. Schabas argues that while it has the features of a hybrid
tribunal, ultimately the SCSL is a product of international law, and not domestic law,
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thereby classifying it as a true ad hoc tribunal. The court also did not pursue indictments
for violations of Sierra Leonean law, even though they had the right to as dictated by
the statute. Still, the cooperation between national and international systems was
expected to make proceedings easier on the OTP. The trials and sentences were also
carried out for the most part in Sierra Leone.
Evidence
Witness testimony was also an important feature of the evidence presented at the
SCSL. The rules of this court actually enabled the OTP to compel witnesses to testify at
risk of self-incrimination. If the tribunal did rely on self-incriminating testimony, that
testimony could not be used in a subsequent prosecution against the witness for any
offence other than false testimony. Protection of witnesses, punishment of false
testimony, and a dedication to the Rules of Procedure rendered the tribunal with a high
degree of credibility. The fact that the Sierra Leonean government was instrumental in
procuring such evidence (as opposed to the governments of former Yugoslavia that
resisted the ICTY’s efforts) meant that obtaining reliable information corroborated by
forensic evidence was not a major challenge faced by the SCSL (Dittrich 2014).
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, though established concurrently with
the SCSL, did not interact with it very often. While both the TRC and SCSL were
concerned with establishing a reliable and thorough historical record, in the interest of
preserving the investigations they launched the SCSL often had to deny or postpone the
TRC’s requests for witness testimony or information (First Annual Report 2002).
Further, the pursuit of factual truth was hampered by the nature of trial proceedings.
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For example, the rights of the accused prevented a judgement being rendered in three
cases presented before the SCSL (Dittrich 2014).
The 13 indictments rendered by the OTP resulted in eight convictions across
three separate trials. The trials were grouped according to the suspect’s affiliation.
Punishment for the convictions ranged from probation and parole to over 50 years of
imprisonment. With only one suspect unaccounted for, the court has no further matters
to pursue.

Reactions
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
The tribunal was met with varied reactions among Yugoslavian nationals. A
major challenge toward the perceived success of the tribunal was the influence of
Yugoslavian political leaders on the public’s interpretation of both the conflict and the
role of the tribunal. Hodžić reveals that, “over the years, the Tribunal was accused of
everything from persecuting innocent heroes for crimes that were never committed to
torturing and killing defenseless martyrs…” (Hodžić 2011). This is a substantial
hindrance toward the goal of uniting a public divided along deeply ingrained ethnic
and national lines, considering a 2014 survey conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina
confirmed that over 70% of those polled relied on politicians for information on war
crimes. Because of this, public opinion in the wake of the ICTY did not laud the
‘success’ of the tribunal in prosecuting perpetrators, but instead questioned its validity
all together. Despite the evidence produced by the tribunal, there was a widespread
denial of crimes committed against members of ‘the other side’, or of crimes perpetrated
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within one’s own ethnic group (Hodžić 2011). As a result, victims of the Yugoslav wars
found themselves disappointed by the outcomes of the ICTY (Ramulić 2011).
Special Court for Sierra Leone
The domestic reaction of the SCSL was also varied. Sierra Leoneans were not
divided on who they viewed as the perpetrators of atrocities during the civil war, but
rather they were skeptical of the mandate of the court and its scope. Nkansah describes
a disconnect between who Sierra Leoneans saw bearing responsibility for offenses of
human rights and the statute set out to prosecute. This is only exacerbated by the small
number of indictments pursued by the SCSL. The mandate was viewed as too narrow,
and “failure to meet these expectations affected people’s confidence in the entire
process” (Nkansah 2014).
Sierra Leonean officials were said to have viewed the SCSL with suspicion. Some
saw the government's request to prosecute via an internationalized court was a political
move to get rid of the RUF, which had developed into a political party in Sierra Leone.
One official of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission said of the tribunal, “The
greatest hypocrisy is injustice or abuse of human rights or pursuit of political ends
under the disguise of justice” (Nkansah 2014). Some even claimed that the international
community’s involvement in the SCSL was with the agenda of testing out a new mode
of criminal justice. Under this view, Sierra Leone became a guinea pig to test the
internationalized criminal tribunal alongside a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Though there are reports of some Sierra Leoneans being satisfied with the justice
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produced by the SCSL, the tribunal bred more doubt and dissatisfaction than
anticipated (Hayner 2011).

Analysis
With the stated goals of the ICTY and the SCSL in mind, we can evaluate the
extent to which these tribunals fulfilled their mandates and met the theoretical
expectations for what the functions of ICTs are.
Punishment of Perpetrators
While perpetrators were indeed prosecuted by the tribunals, that does not
necessarily mean that the punishments rendered by the ICTs were meaningful in the
way it was intended or that they could address the totality of the harm suffered by
civilians in conflict. Hodžić explains that in the case of the ICTY, victims looked directly
at sentences delivered by the court as a way to measure the justice being served. Many
victims recognize that there is no adequate way to punish the perpetrators of atrocities,
but beyond that the sentences delivered were viewed as inadequate and inconsistent
particularly in regard to the notion of deterring future atrocities (Hodžić 2011).
For the Sierra Leonean public, there was a disconnect between local notions of
justice compared to the SCSL’s mandate to only prosecute those who bore the greatest
responsibility for the atrocities. This meant that the few indictments the SCSL did
pursue were only for high level political leaders, not the commanders or foot soldiers
who committed violent acts. Just because someone was not in a position of power did
not mean they were absolved of violence in the Sierra Leonean view. Further,
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combatants or leaders on the side of the government were not prosecuted by the SCSL,
despite civilian recognition that violence came from all sides of the conflict, not just the
side that wasn’t cooperating with government efforts to prosecute war crimes (Nkansah
2014). Across both tribunals, it is not clear whether perpetrators were punished in a way
that would fulfill the goals of ending impunity or finding justice through punishment.
Since in both cases those punished did not align with the view of who constitutes a
‘perpetrator’, the ICTs then could not serve as a public acknowledgement of the harm
suffered throughout each conflict.
Redress for Victims
In the cases of both the ICTY and the SCSL, the function and operations of the
tribunals were not accessible to victims or civilians. The trials for the ICTY were held in
the Netherlands at The Hague, which meant that any victim or civilian who wanted to
see the trial of their oppressor would have to travel to the Netherlands. This is
logistically challenging, beyond being simply unrealistic in a region where conflict was
still intensifying. The SCSL, in theory, should have had an easier time allowing access
for civilians and victims to the trials themselves, as all but one prosecution occurred in
Freetown, Sierra Leone. This was not the case. The operations of the SCSL, as they
mirrored those of the ICTY, appealed to the international community’s understanding
of how justice should be rendered, but not the Sierra Leonean’s understanding. Even
with direct contributions to the court by the Sierra Leonean government, the civilian
population was not considered for the operations of the tribunal. Additionally, there
were issues regarding the physical access to trial proceedings. For example, security
protocol at the SCSL required that all entrants to the court present an ID; most civilians
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couldn’t even see the trial proceedings because they did not have an ID. Neither
tribunal was established in a way that was accessible to the victims they claimed to
serve (Nkansah 2014).
Victim testimony was a feature of each tribunal, which allowed for victims to
face their oppressors and make their stories known in a public forum. The court
officially acknowledging the harm suffered by victims can be interpreted as a form of
social reparation in the interest of healing (Cobban 2006). But, the tribunals did not
provide a mechanism for material reparations. It is important to note that the mandates
of the ICTY and SCSL did not set out a goal of providing material reparations for
victims. However, there is evidence to suggest that the cost of operations detracted
from the possibility of providing reparations. Cobban contrasts the cost of South
Africa’s truth commission following the apartheid regime with the cost of operations
for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. We can draw the same comparison
to ICTY and SCSL. The South African Truth Commission spent less than $4,300 per
case, while the ICTY spent over $10,000,000 per accused, and the SCSL spent over
$23,000,000 per accused (Skilbeck 2008). The international community focused on
funding the operations of the tribunals instead of programs that could materially
support victims. This is especially obvious for the SCSL, which relied on voluntary
donations to function. Though the courts did not aim to provide material reparations to
victims, they also impeded the possibility that reparations could be delivered to the
victims of atrocities.
Establishing the Truth
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While establishing an evidence based record is a key element of any criminal
proceeding, the way in which these trials had to operate inhibited the goal of
establishing the most complete and accurate historical record possible (as is desired by
both these tribunals and truth-seeking methods of reconciliation). The adversarial trial
at its core is driven by two sets of competing narratives. The prosecution advances a
theory of guilt, while the defense has to fulfill their duty to protect their client; this often
means excluding relevant evidence that may violate the Rules of Evidence and
Procedure. In the interest of trying to avoid punishment themselves, the accused have
no incentive to speak truthfully about the full extent of their role in perpetrating
atrocities. This furthers the divide between the victim and the perpetrator; since the
perpetrator must take a defensive stance, the encounter between victims and
perpetrators is not entirely honest. If the alleged perpetrator pleads guilty, the
encounter doesn’t happen at all. The adversarial trial also prescribes only two
outcomes; acquittal or conviction (Wilson 2011).
In former Yugoslavia, the adversarial trial did nothing to prevent the outright
denial of atrocities from the defendants and their supporters. As we saw the tribunal
faced unfounded allegations of bias and prejudice toward certain perpetrators over
others. In fact, the trial of former President Slobodan Milošević before his demise was
an opportunity for Milosevic to draw out proceedings and perpetuate hatred felt among
many Serbs. The evidence collected by the OTP was not a determining factor in how
officials chose to portray the functions and outcomes of the ICTY. While the official
record might be clear about what happened and who perpetrated violence, the
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perception among the civilian population was not. ‘Truth’, then, was not effectively
established by the ICTY (Cobban 2006; Hodžić 2011).
Even in Sierra Leone, where a concurrent Truth and Reconciliation Commission
was established, the slim mandate of the SCSL that prevented many perpetrators from
being tried meant those narratives could not be accounted for in the record the court
was establishing. The limited temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal further restricted its
contribution to forensic or social truth (Dittrich 2014). Evidence of violence that took
place in and around Sierra Leone before 1996 was not brought before the tribunal. The
problem of the potential holes in the record is only exacerbated by the mixed reactions
that tribunal received by Sierra Leonean officials and the public alike.
Despite the in-depth investigations conducted by the OTP’s for the ICTY and
SCSL, the trial format was not able to maintain a single, ‘accurate’ narrative, nor was it
able to account for the totality of the circumstances that brought about the need for
internationalized tribunals in the first place.

Conclusion
Ad hoc international criminal tribunals are a mechanism for the international
community to handle and punish atrocities. In the cases of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ICTs were
also meant to be a mechanism for reconciliation for former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone
respectively. I examined why these courts were unable to function as proponents of
reconciliation by looking at the forms reconciliation can take; these are the
acknowledgement of harm done, redress for victims (material and immaterial), and
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establishing a full and accurate historical record. I found that both the ICTY and the
SCSL were limited by the norms of retribution that undergirded the establishment of
internationalized tribunals at large. Despite their stated commitments in the interest of
reconciliation, neither tribunal produced results that made a discernible impact on
reconciliation in the Balkans or in Sierra Leone.
Instead of serving the suffering populations in former Yugoslavia and Sierra
Leone, the tribunals were a platform for the international community. The international
community could further their normative notions of justice, removed from the regional
and cultural contexts of the civilian populations they were meant to be answering to.
This means that the results of the tribunals are not only removed from local notions of
justice, but from the expectations of transitional justice and reconciliation. The heavy
reliance on retributive justice as an established feature of international criminal
proceedings, “does not bring about the profound social transformation that countries
coming out of violent conflict require” (Subotic 2009). For this reason, even the last chief
prosecutor for the ICTY Serge Brammertz acknowledges that the tribunal was unable to
bring about an acceptance of wrongdoing in former Yugoslavia, which in turn meant
reconciliation was not furthered by the tribunal (Rudic, et al. 2017). For the same reason,
Sierra Leoneans lost confidence in the entire process of the tribunal as it failed to meet
their conception of justice, which did not further reconciliation between the warring
parties.
These findings suggest that the international community’s response to atrocities
needs to look beyond the norms of retributive justice that were so influential in the
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formation of the internationalized criminal tribunal. I do not advocate for the removal
of criminal prosecutions as a mechanism for the international community to rely upon
in the face of grave atrocities. Rather, the international community needs to recognize
that ICTs are a retributive tool and not one that affects reconciliation. With this
realization, bodies such as the United Nations should look critically at how
international legal mechanisms function, what ends they serve, and where funding
ought to be allocated in the interest of their broader goals of establishing peace, justice,
and strong institutions (United Nations 2020). If the limitations of retributive justice on
reconciliation efforts are acknowledged, then the international community will have
made room for conflict resolution efforts that do have a reconciliatory character. So long
as states and international institutions claim this is a goal they share, then they must be
interested not only in indicting perpetrators of atrocities, but in critically examining the
role of retribution in conflict resolution and reconciliation.
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